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VIRTUAL EQUALITY AS CONSTITUTIONAL
REALITY: AN INTRODUCTION
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL*
"Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt."'
Equality is, to be sure, an elusive concept. More often than not,
we find it much easier to describe what is unequal (we know it
when we see it) than affirmatively to explain equality. This defini-
tional dilemma rises to new heights when courts, in exercising
their interpretive legal functions, have to provide all persons the
equal protection of the laws."
2
Over the course of American history and jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court itself has a checkered past when it comes to judi-
cial application of rights to equality. In the beginning, there was
slavery-the quintessence of unequality-and the consequent de-
nial of human status to an entire race of people forcibly brought to
this country.3 Subsequently, equal protection was born (at least on
paper) in the Civil War Amendments4 which purported to confer
to freed slaves their constitutional rights as United States citizens
and as persons, including the equal protection of the laws. Plessy
v. Ferguson5 effectively relegated this equality right to second-
class citizenship by declaring the constitutionality of the separate
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Many thanks to my research
assistant Alison Nicole Stewart ('96) for her invaluable work. I also want to thank the
editors and staff of the St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary for asking me to write the
introduction to this very interesting Civil Rights Symposium. I have known many of the
members since their 1L days and it is a great pleasure to see such commitment and dedica-
tion to protecting human rights.
1 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3 The importation of slaves was not prohibited until 1808 and the institution of slavery
was not outlawed until Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation in 1863.
4 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude .. .shall exist
within the United States. ... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("All persons born or naturalized
in the United States... are citizens of the United States. ... "); U.S. CONST. amend. XV
("The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied.., on account of
race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
5 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 400 (1954). The
Court rejected a 14th Amendment challenge to segregation, or "Jim Crow" laws. Id.
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but equal doctrine. Today, the Court continues to grapple with
(and balk at) the challenges of defining and securing real equality
for at least some of those who ostensibly comprise "We the
people."6
The Supreme Court is not alone in its attempts to ascertain the
meaning of true or "real" equality. For example, Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow suggests that there are three different ap-
proaches to constitutional equality: neutral equality, special
treatment and recognizing/accommodating differences.7 Neutral
equality is encapsulated in the legal phrase, "treating similarly-
situated people similarly."8 However, such a formulation does not
always yield neutral results. As Catherine MacKinnon points out,
in the context of gender where men and women are often posited
as dissimilar, "sex equality thus becomes a contradiction in terms,
something of an oxymoron . . . ."9 Other feminist scholars have
struggled with the issues and conflicts associated with legal, social
and practical definitions of equality, resulting in what Professor
Mary Becker describes as formal equality (i.e., neutral equality)
and three alternative strands: Catherine MacKinnon's dominance
approach, which focuses on women's subordination (women's une-
quality); Robin West's hedonic theory which proposes that women
aim for greater subjective well-being; and Margaret Radin's prag-
matic view that women should use whatever approach works. 10
The very fact that one concept-equality-can result in a multi-
plicity of strands, approaches and definitions, creates more than
the appearance that a "jurisprudence of doubt" might well be in
the making.
Any consideration of "what is equality?" must incorporate the
realization that the various definitions indicate, and are in fact
predicated upon, factors that may be inimical to the very notion of
equality, e.g., cultural bias and prejudice. One of the central
problems evident in any of these analytical constructs is that
equality requires a comparative context that posits the question
6 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
7 Carrie Meckel-Meadow, Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making
New Voices in the Law, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 29, 46 (1987).
8 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
9 CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 33
(Harvard University Press 1987).
10 Mary Becker, Strength in Diversity: Feminist Theoretical Approaches to Child Custody
and Same-Sex Relationships, 23 STETSON L. REV. 701, 701-04 (1994).
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"equal to what?" Such contextualized inquiry presumes a norma-
tive model as a comparison to which all else is evaluated and val-
ued. By definition, the normative model becomes the signpost for
normalcy and results in those people and paradigms fitting the
model being more equal than those others who deviate from the
established norm. Such reliance on the primacy of normativity is
particularly troubling when the framework for equality jurispru-
dence is a society as diverse as the United States.
Our heterogeneity is something in which we pride ourselves.
Yet that very diversity often places us at odds with each other,
particularly during tough economic times. With diminishing re-
sources, the enrichment that our diversity brings cedes to a zero
sum game approach. At such times, for instance, the hiring of a
"diverse" candidate is equated to the exclusion of his/her main-
stream counterpart/competitor. Diversity becomes oppositional-
ity. The "norm" becomes the measure of qualifications, and "dif-
ference" becomes a symbol of the lack thereof.
The role of normativity is of particular importance in legal anal-
ysis because traditional legal thought-purportedly objective, ra-
tional and neutral-is constructed around the aspirational, nor-
mal (but really mythical) "reasonable man." This "reasonable
man" was made in the image of the heroic "founding fathers" and
resulted in a skewed model of what the standard is/should be.
This model of normalcy is gendered (male); racialized (white);
ethnicized (Western European/Anglo); classed (formally educated
and propertied); sexualized (heterosexual); religious-based (Judeo-
Christian); and ability-defined (physically and mentally). Each of
the indicia of normativity is part of a rite of passage for the "rea-
sonable man" and his progeny. Each of an individual's divergent
traits represents a deviation from the norm, a degree of separation
from the aspirational model, a mark of a deficiency or defect. Such
deviation from the norm is both a symptom of inequality and its
justification.
This static model is anathema to a heterogeneous, democratic
and ever-changing society. Thus, it is not surprising that the un-
principled normative intransigence of this model and its concomi-
tant social/cultural/political inertia (of rest, not motion) has been
subject to serious challenge. An exciting proliferation of outsider
1995]
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jurisprudence-critical race theory," feminist theory,'2 and most
recently critical race feminism 3-has taken issue with the tradi-
tional concept of "normal." These critiques expose the myth of
neutrality, rationality and objectivity in the law. They refute the
propriety of the application of the traditional, exclusionary norma-
tive model as the fitting basis to test equality in the law. The criti-
ques urge the recognition that subjectivities-social, cultural,
political, educational, technological, economic, ethnic, sexual, gen-
der, and race factors-are essential to ascertaining and establish-
ing the rule of law. Instead of being wedded to an inalterable, es-
tablished (narrow) model, legal norms should be fluid and
malleable to accommodate the needs and demands of our con-
stantly evolving society.
Notwithstanding the eloquence, forcefulness and persuasive-
ness of these voices and the stories they tell, a scrutiny of recent
Supreme Court decisions as represented in this Symposium
reveals that the critiques of normativity have had no impact on
our highest level decision-makers. To the contrary, it appears
that such interesting descriptions of "color-blindness" for society
and law, "reverse discrimination" for what is just basic discrimi-
nation, and "illegal aliens" for undocumented foreigners, are mod-
ern proxies for "neutrality," "rationality," and "objectivity." The
Supreme Court appears beholden to a status quo set in the Feder-
alist Papers, "founding fathers," pre-Civil War era. While claim-
ing judicial restraint, the Court is being quite activist14 and is now
more than ever committed to jurisprudential stasis (and perhaps
even reactionism).
As Professor Frank Askin indicates in Two Visions of Justice,
several justices on the present bench "exalt... 'judicial restraint'
and . . . demonize . . . 'judicial activism'"' 5 as pretext to refrain
from exercising flexibility in crafting often necessary and just re-
lief. Yet, a study of the Court's decisions reveals the very activism
11 See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliogra-
phy, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 passim (1993).
12 See Paul M. George & Susan McGlamery, Women and Legal Scholarship: A Bibliogra-
phy, 77 IOWA L. REV. 87 passim (1991).
13 RxcHARD DELGADO, CRrrIcAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE pt. IX (Temple Univer-
sity Philadelphia 1995).
14 Frank Askin, Two Visions of Justice: Federal Courts at a Crossroads, 11 ST. JOHN'S J.
LEGAL ComMENT. 63, 63 (1995).
15 Id.
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that the Court purports to eschew. Hiding behind the mask of re-
straint, the Court halts constitutional history, overlooks post-Civil
War constitutional amendments and ignores Warren era prece-
dent' 6 -precedent that sought to forbid states from depriving
"any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person ... the equal protection of the laws." 7 By
abrogating its obligation to "be the guardian of fundamental
rights" the Court is failing the people whose rights it is charged to
protect.
One of the models the Court selects to promote equality is itself
proof of the non-neutrality of its perspective and of its failure to
recognize the need for flexibility to accommodate change. In De-
segregating an Ideal, Mark S. Davies reveals the absence of point-
of-view-lessness of Supreme Court decisions by detailing the
Court's acceptance of the "suburban neighborhood school" model
as the aspirational educational norm.18 The endorsement of this
paradigm is an approbation of the preference for communities
which are "demographically homogeneous, particularly in matters
of race and income."' 9 Certainly, such a pre-Brown v. Board of
Education model is but a reflection of the larger design of that
mythical "reasonable man." Plus a change ... 2 0
As the articles included in this volume plainly show, the consid-
erations of equality cover a broad spectrum of concerns. Division
of power issues, such as federalism 2 ' have a potentially great im-
pact on the development of law and the enunciation of rights (to
equality) in our society. History confirms the potency of federal
16 Id. at 66 ("Thomas writes as though constitutional history ended in 1789, and the
constitutional revolution of 1865 never occurred ... .
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
18 Mark S. Davies, Desegregating an Ideal: Neighborhood Schools, Urban School Sys-
tems and Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 89, 91 (1995). The author
analyzes three recent desegregation decisions to show how any reference to an "ideal public
school" refers to one in the suburbs. Id.
19 Id. at 91. The author cites to Justice O'Connor's description of "white flight" as the
result of"natural, if unfortunate, demographic forces." Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038,
2060 (1995).
20 Or so the French proverb goes, "the more things change, the more they stay the same."
21 See, e.g., Frank J. Macchiarola, State and Local Government Power and the 1994-1995
Term of the United States Supreme Court, 11 ST. JoHN'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 19, 31 (1995).
Significantly, Dean Macchiarola notes that while the Supreme Court failed to endorse state
sovereignty in the case of term limits, he points to Justice Thomas' strong dissent to signal
the expansive view of state power that some justices hold. Id. This pro-states' rights view is
confirmed in the Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525
(1995). In Rosenberger, for the first time in history, the Court approved direct funding of
religious activities by an arm of the state government. Id.
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power through the Commerce Clause, especially as used in the
early days of civil rights jurisprudence.2 2 Yet the invalidation of
the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 as an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of congressional authority in United States v. L6pez,23 is a
signpost for a reversal in that trend. The L6pez Court, much as
the Two Visions of Justice piece fears, seems to halt or turn back
constitutional (Commerce Clause) history by relying on Federalist
Paper 45's statement that the enumerated powers of the federal
government are "few and defined," thus prohibiting national ac-
tion with respect to what we can all agree is a national tragedy:
guns in schools. Again, in the guise of "restraint" the Court exer-
cised its activist muscle by ignoring post-Federalist Papers
precedent.24
The About F.A.C.E. note also raises interesting and pertinent
issues concerning the equality and liberty rights of women by
questioning the constitutional sustainability, in light of L6pez, of
the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act ("F.A.C.E.). 25 The
rights of women over their bodies and destinies are central to any
equality discussion. The role of law is particularly significant
with respect to defining and determining women's place in society
and their status vis d vis men, considering the fact that women did
not participate with any widespread authority in the declaration
and development of the vast majority of constitutional law. The
Constitution was indeed, and still is to a large degree, blind to
22 Anna Kampourakis & Robin C. Tarr, Note, About F.A. C.E. in the Supreme Court: The
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act in Light of L6pez, 11 ST. JOmN'S J. LEGAL COM-
MENT. 191, 194-200 (1995). The authors review the historical background of the Commerce
Clause as used to validate civil rights actions. Id. This raises the question whether the
employment of, as well as reliance on, the Commerce Clause, as effective as it was in its
heyday, was the proper foundation upon which to build equal rights and protections, partic-
ularly in light of present-day erosion of the clause's potency.
23 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
24 Kampourakis & Tarr, supra note 22, at 202-03 (indicating that Court's interpretivist
reliance on original intent is ineffective to deal with modern-day needs and that many of
hard-fought gains won in such areas as civil rights for Black Americans might be placed in
jeopardy by decisions such as Lpez).
25 See Kampourakis & Tarr, supra note 22, at 214-18 (noting possibility that L6pez deci-
sion may result in reversal of decisions upholding F.A.C.E. as courts may find that obstruc-
tion of entrances to abortion clinics and its attending violence does not have substantial
effect on commerce while also suggesting alternative constitutional grounds for validity of
F.A.C.E.).
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women.2 6 Now it is being argued (erroneously, yet successfully) to
be color-blind as well. 27
For instance, Dean Macchiarola reviews the voting redistricting
cases and the attending claims of racial gerrymandering, includ-
ing Shaw v. Reno.28 In that case and others like it, the politics of
the Court yields the following result: four justices aim for real
equality which requires consideration of historic inequities (mean-
ing it requires considerations of the plight of Blacks) and four jus-
tices insist on virtual equality and impose "color-blindness" as the
rule (meaning ignoring the historical plight of Blacks) notwith-
standing the lasting impact of two centuries of racism and the fact
that such so-called "color-blindness" results in white districts.
Justice O'Connor constitutes a swing vote ensuring that these re-
districting cases and the judicial trend they set can do nothing but
promote a jurisprudence of doubt.
Issues of rights, powers and uncertainty also arise in the crimi-
nal context. In Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions,29 the authors
explain how the Supreme Court's fluctuating standard for the suf-
ficiency of the reasonable doubt jury instruction has decreased the
availability of a federal challenge to deficient instructions. In par-
ticular, the authors critique the Court's recent Victor v. Ne-
braska30 holding which lowers the standard of review of jury in-
structions to a "reasonable likelihood" that the instruction was
applied unconstitutionally. This less stringent standard of review
26 It should be noted that gender classifications still receive less than strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis. See, e.g., Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 273 (1979) ("This Court's recent cases teach that such [gender-based] classifica-
tions must bear a close and substantial relationship to important governmental objec-
tives.") (citations omitted). But see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994)
(holding that peremptory challenges cannot be exercised on basis of sex); Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (holding that "classifications based upon sex, like classifi-
cations based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny"). The subject of peremptory challenges is
also discussed infra at notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
27 See Karen M. Berberich, Note, Strict in Theory, Not Fatal in Fact: An Analysis of
Federal Affirmative Action Programs in the Wake of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peia, 11
ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 101 (1995). In Adarand, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), Justice
Scalia, in a concurring opinion, states that "[iln the eyes of government, we are just one
race ..... Id. at 2119 (Scalia, J., concurring). One might ask to which race he is referring.
28 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). The drawing of districts in North Carolina predominantly on
the basis of race was held to be a violation of equal protection. Id. at 2832.
29 Henry D. Gabriel & Katherine A Barski, Reasonable Doubt Jury Instructions: The
Supreme Court Struggles to Live by Its Principles, 11 ST. JOHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 73
(1995). In addition to the federalism issues raised by the authors, the article discusses the
fundamental importance of the reasonable doubt standard.
30 114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994).
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constitutes an erosion of the federal rights of criminal defendants
and possibly infringes on their rights to a presumption of inno-
cence and a fair, impartial trial.
The Supreme Court also has retreated from its lofty stands con-
cerning cruel and unusual punishment. This retrenchment is
most evident, of course, in the re-institution of the death penalty
in Gregg v. Georgia.31 To be sure, the death penalty is the subject
of much emotional debate with the international community gen-
erally rejecting such form of punishment 32 and the United States
insisting on its sovereign right to impose it. 33 Notwithstanding
the Gregg case, grave doubts as to the appropriateness of the
death penalty plague the justices. A quintessential example of
this-one of great relevance to the notion of equality-is Justice
Blackmun's statement upon retirement that after years of sup-
porting the death penalty, he had concluded that it was
unconstitutional:
Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the
death penalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable
consistency, or not at all, and, despite the effort of the states
and courts to devise legal formulas and procedural rules to
meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remains
fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and
mistake. 34
Particularly daunting in light of such concerns is the Court's rul-
ing in Stanford v. Kentucky3 5 which affirms the constitutionality
of the imposition of the death penalty on minors. Just one year
prior, the Court had concluded in Thompson v. Oklahoma36 that
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution
31 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Supreme Court held that the death penalty as punishment
for certain crimes does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 186-87.
32 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 6(2), 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR] ("In countries which have not abolished the
death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes . . .).
"Sentence of death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below 18 years of
age and shall not be carried out on pregnant women." Id. at art. 6(5).
33 The United States, in acceding to the ICCPR, took a reservation to article 6:
The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to im-
pose capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted
under existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, includ-
ing such punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.
34 Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
35 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
36 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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of a defendant convicted of first degree murder for an offense com-
mitted when he was fifteen-years-old. The Court applied the
"evolving standards of decency" and concluded the execution of a
person who was younger than sixteen-years-old when s/he com-
mitted the capital offense, did not conform to those standards.
Perhaps prognosticating a trend much more evident now, the
shift from Thompson to Stanford was made possible by Justice
O'Connor's swing vote. In her Thompson concurrence, she sided
with Justices Stevens, Blackmun and Marshall, finding that the
death penalty was unconstitutional. In her Stanford concurrence,
she joined Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White (who constituted the
Thompson dissenters) and Kennedy (who did not participate in
Thompson), and concluded that the imposition of capital punish-
ment on an individual for a crime committed at sixteen or seven-
teen years of age did not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Noting that it is the job of the Justices to identify what the
"evolving standards of decency" are, Justice Scalia, speaking for
the majority, ironically set the eighteenth century as the appropri-
ate framework within which to decide the constitutionality of the
imposition of the death penalty on minors in the twentieth
century.
3 7
The decision in Stanford flies in the face of international stan-
dards which expressly proscribe the imposition of the death pen-
alty on persons under eighteen. Thus, our jurisprudence rejects
international standards of decency, which rejection places us in
interesting company. The United States is the only industrialized
state that still imposes the death penalty at all. Moreover, other
than the United States, the only six countries worldwide known to
have executed juveniles in the last decade are Barbados (which
has since raised the age to eighteen), Iran, Iraq, Nigeria, Pakistan
and Bangladesh. 9
In this context, it is not surprising that although the Supreme
Court has never directly ruled on the constitutionality of chain
37 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.
38 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. The United States reserved against the
part of this provision that proscribes imposition of the death penalty on minors but acceded
to the portion that prohibits the imposition of the death penalty on pregnant women. Id.
39 NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., Juveniles (on file with author).
1995]
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gangs, the author of Prometheus Rebound40 doubts that such form
of punishment, disgraceful as it may be, would be deemed cruel
and unusual. In the wake of Stanford, it seems indeed doubtful
that the Supreme Court would be willing to define "standards of
decency"41 by international or any such high standards of inhu-
man(e) treatment. In the present socio-political climate, the con-
stitutional validity of chain gangs does not pose any obstacle for
the revival of the odious practice in some states and its proposed
revival in many others. Significantly, the racial and economic
dimensions of criminal incarceration in our society, past and pres-
ent, illustrate a serious predicament in the equality debate.
The concept of equality also arises in the area of peremptory
challenges-a practice that the note Batson Challenges and the
Jury Project,42 views as having outlived its usefulness in the jury
selection process given the Supreme Court's decision not to allow
discriminatory peremptories without cause.43 The authors state
that the purpose of the right to a jury trial is "to eliminate poten-
tial prejudice and bias and to establish fair and impartial juries."
While certainly that should be the goal, in actual practice both
sides (prosecution and defense) effectively rely on peremptory
challenges-challenges which, by definition, need not be ex-
plained, to try and weed out those potential jurors whose view-
point differs from the one forming the basic theory of their case.
Swain v. Alabama,4 4 is a perfect example of this strategy. In that
case, Blacks were entirely excluded from the jury and a Black man
convicted of raping a white woman was subsequently sentenced to
death. Clearly this tactic is antithetical to the search for a fair
and impartial jury. To allow a challenge with a view to an out-
come-determinative result is not a search for fairness and imparti-
ality; rather, it is an attempt to stack the deck in favor of a desired
result regardless of its correctness. 45 The Court has prohibited
40 Consuelo A. Vasquez, Note, Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving Standards of De-
cency: The Resurrection of the Chain Gang, 11 ST. JOS'S J. LEGAL CoMMENT. 221, 256-58
(1995).
41 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
42 James A. Domini & Eric Sheridan, Note, Batson Challenges and the Jury Project: Is
New York Ready to Eliminate Discrimination from Jury Selection?, 11 ST. JoNs J. LEGAL
ComiENT. 169 (1995).
43 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (holding state must have race neutral
reason for challenging minority jurors).
44 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
4 See Domini & Sheridan, supra note 42, at 169. The authors state that the purpose of
the right to a jury trial is "to eliminate potential prejudice and bias and to establish fair
[Vol. 11:1
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race-based 46 as well as sex-based 47 peremptories, reasoning that
such discrimination in the jury selection does unconstitutional
harm to litigants, jurors, members of the excluded community and
society as a whole. However, and importantly, as evident in Her-
ndndez v. New York,4 the Court refused to apply the Batson and
J.E.B. rationales to language, with possible discriminatory effects.
It is at least arguable, if not probable (although the Court rejected
this position), that language can be a proxy for ethnicity or na-
tional origin, both of which are protected classifications.4 9 Yet the
Court's dismissal of the proxy argument reinforces its "color-
blind" perspective, much like the "pregnant person"50 category
reveals its gender-blind approach-approaches that engender
only virtual, not real, equality.
In The Davis Case and the First Amendment, Professor Margu-
lies continues the exposition of subjectivity in judicial, particu-
larly Supreme Court, decision-making. He reveals that Davis,5
by permitting the government to ignore known discriminatory
consequences, and allowing analysis solely on the basis of discrim-
inatory intent, under the guise of neutrality perpetuates the any-
thing-but-neutral status quo. Facially, Davis insists that the
Court's only obligation in dealing with fundamental constitutional
rights is to remain neutral. Such a "neutral" approach impedes
the rectification of race, sex and ethnicity disparities because
based on historical facts, the status quo is racialized, sexualized,
ethnicized and gendered.
and impartial juries." Id. While certainly that should be the goal, in actual practice both
sides (prosecution and defense) effectively rely on peremptory challenges-challenges
which, by definition, need not be explained, to try and weed out those potential jurors
whose view-point differs from the one forming the basic theory of their case. Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), is a perfect example of this strategy. In that case, Blacks were
entirely excluded from the jury and a Black man convicted of raping a white woman was
subsequently sentenced to death. Id. at 202. Clearly this tactic is antithetical to the search
for a fair and impartial jury.
46 Batson, 476 U.S. at 100.
47 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994) ("Gender, like race, is an
unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality.").
48 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
49 Courts have held that "Hispanics" are a cognizable racial group. See Domini & Sheri-
dan, supra note 42, at 183.
50 See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974). The Court upheld the exclusion of preg-
nancy from state disability insurance finding that such classification, i.e., pregnant versus
non-pregnant persons, was not gender-based. Id. at 496-97.
51 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (rejecting challenge to civil service examination as racially
discriminatory).
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The Rehnquist Court's ostensibly neutral approach to equality
(which while plainly neutral in appearance predestines unequal
results by engrafting the gendered, ethnicized, racialized status
quo as the norm) is in stark contrast to the Warren Court's meth-
odology which never purported to be neutral in the Davis sense.
Rather, in the Warren era, the goal of elimination of racial dispar-
ities from the voting booth to the jails, from housing to jobs,
guided the Court's jurisprudence. During its term, the Warren
Court reformed and transformed law in its zeal to achieve real
equality. On the other hand, the present Court's insistence upon
color-blindness and neutrality simply serves to perpetuate his-
toric, built-in inequality. Consequently, its jurisprudence emerges
as a model of virtual equality. One striking example provided by
Professor Margulies is the absurdity of even suggesting that poor
persons and wealthy persons have an equal right to use their
property to disseminate their respective messages. This is, at
best, a concept "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." If the
poor, having no property, cannot communicate a message for lack
of a forum then the concept of the poor possessing First Amend-
ment rights is spurious.
Just as possession of property can make a difference in one's
ability in actuality to enjoy one's fundamental rights, so can edu-
cation make a difference in one's capability to attain equality of
opportunity. Although the Court has never held that education is
a fundamental right,52 it has recognized that states can regulate
education by, for example, instituting compulsory school attend-
ance requirements. 53 In Check-Out Time at the Hotel California,
in light of the erosion of equality analysis, the author suggests
that the appropriate analytical construct for invalidating the pro-
visions in California's Proposition 187 that seek to deny primary
and secondary education to "illegal aliens," is the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate that no state may "deny to any person
52 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
53 See John R. Bunker, Note, Check-Out Time at the Hotel California: The Last Resort of
Constitutional Arguments and Proposition 187 Considered, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COM-
MErr. 137, 149-55 (1995) (reviewing state compulsory attendance laws and discussing ma-
jor cases with respect to authority of states to control education programs). Such ability of
states to control education programs, however, are not without significant limitations. Id.
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within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."5 4 Given
that education is compelled by law, the author posits that any pro-
hibition by a state of a child's school attendance because of un-
documented status constitutes a denial of the obligation to provide
"protection of the laws" as required by the Constitution.
This "protection of the laws" analysis is particularly attractive
in light of the shrinking reach of equality protections. Moreover,
it would provide protection against the plainly xenophobic provi-
sions of Proposition 187 even in the absence of issues of federal-
ism.5 5 In this context, the Proposition's usage of language is tell-
ing. The term "illegal alien" reveals that the California law is
grounded upon fear of and distaste for the "different," making
"outsiders" fair game for scapegoating. Certainly, there is nothing
in our jurisprudence that even remotely provides a foundation for
either calling a person illegal-although his/her acts, including
his/her presence on United States soil can be-or denominating
persons as "other worldly" although they, of course, can be from
another country and of foreign nationality.
Finally, this "protection of the laws" approach would strengthen
the precedential value of Plyler v. Doe5 6 where a closely divided
Supreme Court recognized the importance of education to Ameri-
can culture and society. The Court ruled that denial of a public
education to children of undocumented foreigners violated the
Equal Protection Clause. Significantly, however, the Court did
not conclude either that education was a fundamental right or
that undocumented status was a suspect class, thus taking the
analysis out of the exacting strict scrutiny level of review. With a
"protection of the laws" framework, the milder level of analysis
will not permit states to deny access to education to all persons
within the jurisdiction, including poor, undocumented children.
54 U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV (emphasis added). Significantly, the phrase "person within
its jurisdictional limits" makes clear that this protection reaches all persons-citizens and
non-citizens (both documented and undocumented) alike.
55 The California provisions were largely stricken in League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) based on notions of federal-
ism-as a constitutional matter, it is the province of the federal government and not of
individual states to regulate immigration based upon the Uniform Rule of Naturalization
Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4) and the Foreign Relations Power Clause (U.S. CONST.
art. 2, § 2, cl. 2). This would not, however, mean much vis e vis the merits of such a provi-
sion if the regulation were included in a federal statute.
56 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Nowhere in our jurisprudence does the issue of equality create
more polarity than in the area of "affirmative action" as narrowly
defined to consist of race-, ethnicity-, and even sex-based "prefer-
ences." The concept, coined in the height of the civil rights era,
was intended to make equality a reality for those who for essen-
tially the entire history of this country had been excluded and
marginalized from enjoying the fruits of social, technical, employ-
ment and educational progress. The Civil Rights Acts, barring
discrimination in employment, education, housing and even immi-
gration on the basis of race, sex, color, national origin and religion,
were the vehicles that would make the dream of equality come
true. Recently, with the affirmative action debate, this dream has
become a nightmare.
Ironically, although affirmative action takes many forms, the
only models under attack are those models that grant "prefer-
ences" to persons of color and majority women. Sometimes the op-
position to these programs sounds in paternalism claiming that
the programs "stigmatize" those they seek to protect, i.e., those
who receive or fall into the category that is designated to receive
the so-called preference. Paul Rockwell in his article Angry White
Guys for Affirmative Action describes the duplicity of the "stigma"
argument. First, he notes that "[w]e hear a lot about the so-called
stigma of affirmative action for minorities and women [and] [w]e
are told that affirmative action harms the psyches of African-
Americans, Latinos[/as], and women."57 Then he unearths the dis-
ingenuousness of such an assertion.
It is a strange argument. Veterans are not stigmatized by the
GI Bill. Europeans are not stigmatized by the Marshall Plan.
Corporate farmers are not stigmatized by huge water give-
aways and million-dollar price supports. The citizens of Or-
ange County, a Republican stronghold, seeking a bailout to
cover their bankers' gambling losses, are not holding their
heads in shame. The $500 billion federal bailout of the sav-
ings and loan industry, a fiasco of deregulation, is the biggest
financial set-aside program in U.S. history. Its beneficiaries
feel no stigma.
57 Paul Rockwell, Angry White Guys for Affirmative Action at http://
www.inmotionmagazine.com or http://www.cts.com/browse/publish/index3.html.
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Only when the beneficiaries of affirmative action are women
and people of color is there a stigma. Where there is ... no
racism, or sexism, there is no stigma.
Affirmative action is already part of the fabric of American
life. We are all bound together in a vast network of affirma-
58tive action ....
Notwithstanding the patent infirmity of this "stigma" rationale,
the Supreme Court has embraced it as an appropriate basis to dis-
mantle racial preferences: "[u]nless [race-based classifications] are
strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote
notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostil-
ity."59 Yet, veterans' preferences 60 and alumni preferences 61 re-
main happily in place.
As the Strict in Theory, Not Fatal In Fact article explains, the
decisions of the Court over the last decade have eroded the utilita-
rian nature of affirmative action as a tool to achieve real equality.
Starting with Bakke, 62 followed by Croson63 and culminating in
Adarand64 the Court has narrowed the scope of relief to such an
extent so as to render it illusory. To be sure, the Court in
Adarand makes it clear that affirmative action remains viable as
a form of relief. However, the new test sets a "strict scrutiny"
standard of review. Any plan, to satisfy constitutional require-
ments, must be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state inter-
est.65 Again relying on color-blindness, the Court rolls the law
58 Id.
59 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (emphasis added).
60 Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280-81 (1979).
61 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 946 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub norn, Thurgood Mar-
shall Legal Soc. v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
62 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (stating that preference for
"members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination
for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids.").
63 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (illus-
trating Scalia's color-blind approach which simply ignores history of racial discrimination
and segregation). Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, explained his view of "prefer-
ences" as unconstitutional: "[r]acial preferences appear to 'even the score' . .. only if one
embraces the proposition that our society is appropriately viewed as divided into races,
making it right that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be compen-
sated for by discriminating against a white." Id. at 528.
64 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefla, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995). "By requiring strict scru-
tiny of racial classifications, we require courts to make sure that a government classifica-
tion based on race, which" so seldom provide[s] a relevant basis for disparate treatment, "is
legitimate, before permitting unequal treatment based on race." (citation omitted). Id. at
2113.
65 Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2117 ("Racial classifications... must serve a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
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back in time to an era when is was legal and accepted to use color
as a reason to exclude. Under the rubric of "reverse discrimina-
tion" (a telling term as it forces one to ask reverse to what?), we
are led to the inescapable conclusion that the normative, exclu-
sionary model still reigns. Although discrimination on the basis of
race is illegal discrimination pure and simple, discrimination
against the "majority" is called something different because it is
somewhat more wrong than discriminating against "outsiders"-
the Court thus relies on race in order to proscribe reliance on race.
The recent Hopwood v. Texas66 Fifth Circuit decision leaves no
doubt that lower courts are ready and eager to follow the Supreme
Court's lead in retrenching affirmative action relief. Hopwood re-
jected a racial preference scheme instituted by the University of
Texas School of Law in order to remedy its admitted, historic de
jure discrimination-incidentally the sole recognized compelling
state interest in modern constitutional doctrine. 67 Hopwood fol-
lowed the Court's declared preference for a color-blind scheme,
even in an institution that admittedly had historically expressly
excluded those at whom the "preferences" program was aimed.
Significantly, because of its past racially exclusionary practices,
the Texas alumni are overwhelmingly a racially homogeneous
(white) group. Nonetheless, the same Hopwood court that invali-
dated racial and ethnic preferences stated that "[w]hile the use of
race per se is proscribed .. a university may properly favor one
applicant over another because of his[/her] .. .relationship to
school alumni."68 This, too, claims to be a color-blind standard. To
be sure, this ought not come as a surprise after the "neutrality"
driven Court decisions insisting that pregnancy is not sex-re-
lated69 and that Spanish language ability is not national-origin
related.70
66 78 F.3d 932, cert. denied sub nom, Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc. v. Hopwood, 116 S.
Ct. 2580 (1996).
67 Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) ("Modern equal protection
has recognized only one interest: remedying the effects of racial discrimination.")
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was joined in her dissent by Justices Rehn-
quist, Scalia and Kennedy. Id. Justice Thomas, who joined the Court after the Metro
Broadcasting decision was rendered, joined the dissenting judges in Metro Broadcasting to
make that dissenting position the Adarand majority.
68 Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 946.
69 Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974).
70 Hernflndez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 375 (1991).
"No matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the explanation for a
peremptory strike may be, the strike does not implicate the Equal Protection Clause
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This retrogression of our equality jurisprudence is deeply troub-
ling in light of the country's history. Most distressing of the conse-
quences is that this neutral and blind construct renders the at-
tainment of real equality overwhelmingly difficult, if not
impossible. Professor Thurow's foot-race imagery, used to explain
the equality dilemma, particularly in a construct that has been
erected on inequality, is enlightening and sobering:
Imagine a race with two groups of runners of equal ability.
Individuals differ in their running ability, but the average
speed of the two groups is identical. Imagine that a handicap-
per gives each individual in one of the groups a heavy weight
to carry. Some of those rimners with weights would still run
faster than some of those without weights, but on average, the
handicapped group would fall farther and farther behind the
group without the handicap.
Now suppose that someone waves a magic wand and all of the
weights vanish. Equal opportunity has been created. If the
two groups are equal in their running ability, the gap between
those who never carried weights and those who used to carry
weights will cease to expand, but those who suffered the ear-
lier discrimination will never catch up. If the economic baton
can be handed on from generation to generation, the current
effects of past discrimination can linger forever."-
The Court's present view of equality mirrors Thurow's hypo-
thetical race with very real life consequences. The Court's imposi-
tion of a color-blind standard in 1996, when a color-bound stan-
dard had existed in one respect or another for over two
centuries,72 is no different from doing away with a handicap three-
fourths of the way into a four-lap race. I am not a betting woman,
but given the odds for the completion of that last lap, it is not a
major risk to predict the victor as the team never hindered by the
weights-the weight of discrimination. The fairness or even-
handedness-the equality-of the conditions that exist in the run-
unless it is based on race. That is the distinction between disproportionate effect,
which is not sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation, and intentional dis-
crimination which is."
Id. (O'Connor, Scalia, JJ., concurring).
71 LESTER THURow, THE ZERo-SuM SociETY 188 (1980).
72 It is indisputable that in this country inequality was the rule with respect to state
action until the passage of the Civil War Amendments and with respect to private action
until the mid-1960s passage of the Civil Rights Acts.
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ning of the anchor leg is fictional in light of the history; the van-
ishing of the weights creates a myth of fairness-of virtual equal-
ity-that can never translate to real opportunity. This is our
constitutional reality as we prepare to enter the twenty-first
century.
The articles in this Symposium raise fundamental issues of fair-
ness, liberty, justice and equality. The Supreme Court has had a
checkered past in all of these areas simply because it has not ex-
isted and does not operate in a vacuum. The rule of law can play a
significant role in addressing inequality as it can in effecting
(in)equality. Equality may be an elusive ideal, but the idea of
working towards a reality that is more just, more fair, more equal,
need not elude us forever.
